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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3-(2)(j). 
GOVERNING LAW 
The following statutory provisions are relevant to this litigation: Utah Code Ann. 
§§78-12-25; 78-12-26. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs in this appeal are Lawrence M. Russell ("Russell") and Russell/Packard 
Development Inc. ("Russell/Packard"), Russell's real estate development company 
(together, the "Russell Plaintiffs"). [R. 72 at % 1; R. 73 at % 2.] Defendant John Thomas 
("Thomas") was Russell's sole partner in a Utah limited liability company known as PRP 
Development, L.C. ("PRP"), which was in the business of buying and selling residential 
lots for development. [R. 74 at % 8; R. 75 at ffif 15, 18.] On November 4, 1996, an entity 
known as CMT, Inc. ("CMT") entered into a contract to purchase 72 undeveloped twin 
home lots located in Saratoga Springs, Utah County (the "Saratoga property") from 
Saratoga Springs Development Company, L.L.C. ("Saratoga") for $25,000 per lot. This 
contract is referred to hereafter as the "Saratoga-CMT transaction." [R. 75 at If 20; R. 77 
at T} 33; R. 79 at f 42.] Neither CMT nor Saratoga is a party to these proceedings. 
On November 8, 1996, PRP, the real estate development entity owned by Plaintiff 
Russell and Defendant Thomas, signed a real estate contract to purchase the Saratoga 
property from CMT. [R. 79 at f 45.] PRP agreed to pay $30,000 per lot for the Saratoga 
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property. [R. 79 at ffi[ 44-45.] 
In April of 1997, Russell and Thomas had a falling out and, in an effort to wind up 
the affairs of PRP, they entered into a contract through which, among other things, PRP's 
contract to purchase the Saratoga property from CMT, for $30,000 per lot, was assigned 
to Russell. Russell's assigned right to purchase the lots from CMT is referred to hereafter 
as the UCMT-Russell transaction." [R. 68.] Thereafter, in a series of recorded real estate 
closings, commencing on July 1, 1997, Saratoga conveyed the Saratoga property to CMT, 
which in turn conveyed the property to Plaintiff Russell (as PRP's assignee) for the price 
specified in the real estate purchase contract between PRP and CMT. [R. 43-48.] 
Although the transactions proceeded smoothly according to the contractual terms, 
the Russell Plaintiffs now seek damages for fraud. According to Plaintiffs, at the time 
Saratoga agreed to sell the lots to CMT, Saratoga was under the mistaken belief that it 
was actually selling the lots to PRP. [R. 81 at Tf 58.] Thus, the Russell Plaintiffs, despite 
receiving exactly what they bargained for (i.e., the purchase of the Saratoga property from 
CMT for $30,000 per lot), filed this lawsuit in the fall of 2001. [R. 1-18.] Plaintiffs' 
argument, apparently, is that they are entitled to damages arising out of the CMT-Russell 
transaction because of fraud as to the identity of the buyer in the Saratoga-CMT 
transaction. 
The essence of Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint is that because Saratoga was 
allegedly mistaken about the identity of the buyer of the Saratoga property in the 
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transaction between Saratoga and CMT, fraud was committed on the Russell Plaintiffs in 
the transaction between CMT and Russell. Eight causes of action are alleged: (1) breach 
of fiduciary duty, (2) civil conspiracy, (3) unjust enrichment, (4) conversion and 
misappropriation, (5) breach of principal-agency relationship, (6) intentional interference 
with prospective economic relations, (7) commercial bribery, and (8) fraud. [R. 72-90.] 
As set forth more fully herein, seven of the eight claims (all but the claim for commercial 
bribery), are barred by the statute of limitations, the first six by Plaintiffs' own admission. 
Moreover, the seventh and eight claims fail for other reasons: commercial bribery because 
there is no private right of action; and fraud because the essence of the Russell Plaintiffs' 
Complaint is that Saratoga, an entity which is not a party to this litigation, was defrauded. 
This Court should affirm the trial court's order dismissing the Complaint and Amended 
Complaint with prejudice.1 [R. 191-194.] 
1
 Plaintiffs complain, somewhat tangentially, about the fact that the trial court 
considered documents outside of the scope of the pleadings "for which there was no 
foundation and which are inappropriate on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss." [See, Brief of 
Appellant at p. 21.] The only documents considered, however, were those specifically 
referenced in the Amended Complaint, and the court may consider documents attached as 
exhibits or incorporated by reference in the pleadings when deciding a motion to dismiss. 
2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 3d § 12.34[2] (3d ed. 2002) 
("In deciding whether to dismiss, the court may consider... documents... incorporated 
by reference in the pleadings. . . .") Furthermore, Plaintiffs waived any such objection 
when they conceded at oral argument that they "didn't care about the [Court's 
examination of the contractual documents] because they are what they are." [R. 207 at 
p.37.] 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS2 
1. Russell/Packard is a real estate development corporation engaged in the 
development and construction of residential homes. [R. 72 at U 1.] Russell and Thomas 
were partners in PRP, a Utah limited liability company. [R. 75 at 1J18.] Thomas was the 
manager of PRP. [R. 73 at ^ j 5.] 
2. Carson and Bustos were real estate agents for Wardley Better Homes and 
Gardens. [R. 74 at ^  10.] In the summer of 1996, Carson showed Thomas (who was 
acting for PRP), 72 lots for sale, located in the city of Saratoga Springs, Utah County. [R. 
76 at 1f 26.] 
3. PRP made an offer to purchase the Saratoga property, but not until after 
CMT, an entity which Plaintiffs allege was a sham, had contracted to purchase the lots 
from Saratoga for $25,000 per lot (the "Saratoga-CMT transaction"). [R. 77 at % 33; R. 
80 at U 50.] 
4. On November 8, 1996, CMT resold the lots it had purchased from Saratoga 
to PRP, at a price of $30,000 per lot. [R. 79 at 1fl[ 44,45.] This real estate purchase 
contract was entered into by and between CMT and PRP. [Id.] 
5. On or about April 1997, problems arose between Russell and Thomas, and 
in an effort to separate their business interests, Russell was assigned PRP's contract to 
2
 The relevant facts are based on Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint as the Court 
of Appeals must accept the factual allegations in the Amended Complaint as true. E.g., 
Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991). 
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purchase the Saratoga property from CMT for $30,000 (the "CMT-Russell transaction"). 
[R. 68; 39-42]. 
6. In a series of closings commencing on or about July 1, 1997, Saratoga 
conveyed the Saratoga property to CMT, and CMT conveyed it to Plaintiff Russell. [R. 
43-45.] 
7. CMT had no relationship to Saratoga or PRP. [R, 80 at ^ 52.] However, 
Plaintiffs have alleged that "Defendants represented to Saratoga that CMT was part of, 
affiliated with, or owned by plaintiffs." [R. 82 at f^ 65 (emphasis added).] Plaintiffs have 
further alleged that "Believing CMT was part of, affiliated with, or owned by PRP, 
Saratoga sold the lots to CMT for $25,000 " [R. 82 at f 68 (emphasis added).] 
8. Plaintiffs believed that CMT was the agent, under the control of, owned by, 
or was otherwise acting for Saratoga until the spring of 2000. [R. 81 at ^ 55.] Plaintiffs 
aver in their Amended Complaint, Opposition to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, and at 
oral argument that the alleged fraud was discovered in the spring of 2000. [Id.; R. 68; R. 
207 at p.32 (emphasis added).] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's complete dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint and Amended 
Complaint should be affirmed on four bases. First, Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the 
applicable statutes of limitations. Second, the Russell Plaintiffs lack standing to assert a 
claim for fraud allegedly committed in the Saratoga-CMT transaction, as opposed to the 
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CMT-Russell transaction. Third, the fraud claim fails on its merits. Finally, there is no 
private cause of action for commercial bribery. 
ARGUMENT 
I. ALL OF PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE 
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS. 
Six of the Russell Plaintiffs' claims were subject to a four year statute of 
limitations: breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, unjust enrichment, conversion and 
misappropriation, breach of principal-agency relationship and intentional interference 
with prospective economic relations (together, the "four-year claims")- Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-25. The two remaining causes of actions, commercial bribery and fraud 
(together, the "three-year claims"), were subject to a three year statute of limitations. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26. 
Plaintiffs have argued that by application of the discovery rule, the running of the 
statute of limitations on each cause of action was tolled until the Spring of 2000. [See, 
Brief of Appellant at p. 13.] As set forth below, however, the discovery rule is not 
applicable; and even if it was, it does not save Plaintiffs' claims from the statutes of 
limitations. 
A. The Four-Year Claims are Time-Barred. 
Plaintiffs acknowledge that because the real estate purchase contract between PRP 
and CMT was executed on November 8, 1996, that "absent tolling by the discovery rule, 
the statute of limitations expired on the commercial bribery and fraud claims on 
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November 7, 1999 and on the remaining four-year claims on November 7, 2000." [See, 
Brief of Appellants at p. 13.] 
Plaintiffs have alleged, however, that "in the spring of 2000 (roughly six months 
before the statute of limitations was to expire on the four-year claims), an accountant for 
Saratoga questioned the ownership or control status of CMT.. . [and] plaintiffs were first 
placed on inquiry notice of CMT's control status as well." [R. 81 at fflf 57, 58.] At this 
point, according to Plaintiffs' pleading, they knew - contrary to what they allege they 
previously believed to be the case - that CMT was a completely distinct entity from 
Saratoga. As Plaintiffs' counsel put the matter during oral argument: 
We have alleged that we have a fraud in 1996, and we have alleged that we 
didn't discover it in 2000 until the final take down of the last twelve lots 
where someone in Saratoga's organization is going through the 
paperwork - and we plead this. 
[R. 207 at p. 32.] 
The Russell Plaintiffs thus admit that the facts supporting their claim were 
discovered in the Spring of 2000, at least six months before the statute of limitations ran 
on any of the four-year claims. Consequently, the discovery rule does not apply. The 
Utah Supreme Court has held that the discovery rule does not apply "to a plaintiff who 
becomes aware of his injuries or damages and a possible cause of action before the statute 
of limitations expires." Atwood v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 823 P.2d 1064, 1065 (Utah 1992) 
(citing Brigham Young Univ. v. Paulsen Constr. Co., 744 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1987)). There 
is, thus, no basis for tolling the statute of limitations with respect to the four-year claims. 
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As a consequence, the statute expired on November 7, 2000. The Complaint was not 
filed until November 30, 2001. 
It should be noted that in an effort to avoid the clear application of the relevant 
statutes of limitations, the Russell Plaintiffs have repeatedly played games with the statute 
of limitations analysis. In the proceedings below, they acknowledged that they first 
learned of the alleged problems with the transaction in the Spring of 2000. [R. 81 at Tf 55, 
R. 207 at p. 32] When the Defendants then pointed out that the discovery on this date 
would mean that the statute of limitations had expired on their causes of action, and 
prevailed on this point, the Russell Plaintiffs realized that they had to come up with a 
better story. 
So now Plaintiffs argue, for the first time on this appeal, that while they knew in 
the Spring of 2000 that there had been a fraud, "they did not discover actual facts forming 
the basis for their causes of action until after the November 7, 2001 deadline." [See, 
Brief of Appellant at p. 17.] However, Plaintiffs have not made this assertion before and 
cannot make new arguments or present new theories on appeal. See, LeBaron & Assoc, v. 
Rebel Enters., 823 P.2d 479, 483 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (when no supporting evidence or 
relevant legal authority is introduced at trial in support of the claim, the issue has not been 
preserved for appeal); see also, Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1994) 
("we will review the issues raised for the first time on appeal only if exceptional 
circumstances exist"). Moreover, even if this argument had been made below, under the 
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Atwood case cited above, Plaintiffs' discovery of the alleged fraud in the Spring of 2000 
rendered the discovery rule inapplicable, since the discovery rule does not apply "to a 
plaintiff who becomes aware of his injuries or damages and a possible cause of action 
before the statute of limitations expires." Atwood, 823 P.2d at 1065.3 
B. The Three-Year Claims are Time-Barred. 
With respect to the two remaining causes of action, commercial bribery and fraud, 
both claims fail on the merits (see, Sections II, III and IV below). Furthermore, 
Plaintiffs' fraud claim was required to be brought within three years of the date on which 
the facts constituting fraud were, or reasonably should have been, discovered. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-26 (3). The Utah Supreme Court has explained the fraud statute of 
limitations as follows: 
The words 'until the discovery [of fraud]' are generally 
interpreted as meaning from the time the fraud was actually 
known or could have been discovered through the exercise of 
reasonable diligence. . . . A party who has the opportunity of 
knowing the facts constituting the alleged fraud cannot be 
inactive and afterwards allege a want of knowledge that arose 
by reason of his own laches and negligence. 
3
 Furthermore, this Court should not adopt a policy which allows plaintiffs to plead 
that the statute of limitations ran before discovery of the underlying facts, thus 
implicating the discovery rule, and then take as much time as they need - in this case 1 Vi 
years - to file their claims. This would make the limitations period indeterminate. E.g., 
Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 52 (Utah 1996) (policy underlying statute of 
limitations is to "promote justice by preventing surprises through revival of claims that 
have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and 
witnesses have disappeared") (citations omitted). 
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Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1196 (Utah 1993) (emphasis added; citations omitted). 
Thus, in determining when the statute of limitations began to run on Plaintiffs' 
fraud claim, this Court must decide at what point the alleged fraud was known or could 
have reasonably been discovered. Applying this standard, Plaintiffs' position that they 
were unaware of CMT's role in the transactions is untenable. CMT is named in each real 
estate purchase contract and each deed conveying the Saratoga property, putting the 
Russell Plaintiffs on inquiry notice of CMT's role as early as November 1996. [R. 79 at 
ffi[ 44, 45.] CMT is also named in the assignment from PRP to Plaintiff Russell that was 
executed in April 1997. Finally, in a series of real estate closings beginning in July 1997 
the Saratoga lots were conveyed twice - first from Saratoga to CMT and then from CMT 
to Plaintiffs. [R. 43-48.] Thus, the contracts, assignments and deeds documenting the 
real estate transactions were sufficiently clear to have put the Russell Plaintiffs on inquiry 
notice which, if followed, would have resulted in a discovery of the underlying facts now 
forming the basis for their claims as early as November 1996. [R. 79 at ffif 44, 45; R. 43-
45.] See also, United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 889 
(Utah 1993) (a proxy statement disclosing the very facts upon which allegations arose 
was sufficient to put shareholders on notice that they needed to inquire further). 
The Russell Plaintiffs' second argument, however, is that the mere naming of 
CMT in the documents was not sufficient to put them on inquiry notice because the 
Defendants acted to "fraudulently conceal" CMT's identity from them. [See, Brief of 
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Appellant at p. 18-19.] In determining whether the statute of limitations should be tolled 
due to fraudulent concealment, this court must determine: 
(i) when a plaintiff would reasonably be on notice to inquire 
into a defendant's bad acts despite defendant's attempts to 
hide those acts; and (ii) whether a plaintiff, once on notice, 
reasonably would have discovered, with due diligence, the 
facts on which the cause of action is based despite 
defendant's efforts to hide those facts. 
Hill v. Alfred, 28 P.3d 1271, 1276 (Utah 2001) (citing Berenda, 914 P.2d at 52). 
First, as discussed above the Russell Plaintiffs would reasonably be on notice to 
inquire into CMT's role in the real estate transactions as early as November 1996, and at 
least by April or July of 1997 when the documents bearing the name CMT were provided 
to the Russell Plaintiffs. With respect to concealing CMT's identity, Plaintiffs only 
vaguely assert that the Defendants failed to affirmatively explain the nature of CMT's 
role in the transaction. [R. 80 at j^ 54.] This allegation, however, is insufficient as a 
matter of law to constitute fraudulent concealment. See, Berenda, 914 P.2d at 54 (when 
the "facts underlying the allegation of fraudulent concealment are so tenuous, vague or 
insufficiently established that they fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to 
concealment" the claim should fail as a matter of law). Thus, the Russell Plaintiffs were 
on inquiry notice by July of 1997, at the latest. 
Second, this Court must determine whether the Russell Plaintiffs, once on notice, 
reasonably would have discovered, with due diligence, the facts on which the cause of 
action is based despite defendant's efforts to hide those facts. The Russell Plaintiffs did 
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nothing until the Spring of 2000, and even then did not complete their investigation of the 
facts on which the cause of action was based until November 7, 2001. [See, Brief of 
Appellant at p. 17.] The equitable maxim that "the means of knowledge is equivalent to 
knowledge" should be applied. Berenda, 914 P.2d at 52; see also, Baldwin, 850 P.2d at 
1197 (refusing to toll the statute based on fraudulent concealment where the deed 
effecting the purported fraudulent conveyance had not been concealed, and therefore "the 
means of knowledge" was available to the creditors). All that was required of the Russell 
Plaintiffs was a telephone call to Saratoga, or even CMT, inquiring about the respective 
roles of the parties identified in the transaction. This Court should not allow the Russell 
Plaintiffs to bring a cause of action for fraud five years after the purported problems with 
the transaction (i.e., the involvement of CMT) was clear, wrhen a reasonable person would 
have taken a few simple steps to discover the facts on which the fraud claim is based. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFFS' FRAUD 
CLAIM FOR LACK OF STANDING. 
Apart from to the statute of limitations, the trial court's ruling that the Russell 
Plaintiffs lack standing to bring a fraud claim should be affirmed on three separate, 
independently sufficient grounds: (1) the parties' intention not to assign the Russell 
Plaintiffs anything other than the purchase right is clear on the face of the assignment; 
(2) personal causes of action, such as fraud, are not assignable; and (3) in any event, the 
purported fraud alleged by the Russell Plaintiffs arose out of a transaction to which they 
were not even a party - between Saratoga and CMT. 
579797v 1 12 
First, no cause of action was assigned. Instead, the assignment specifically 
provides: 
PRP agrees to assign to Russell all of its right, title and interest in the 
Contract (signed by PRP as Buyer on November 5, 1996 and signed by 
CMT as Seller on November 8, 1996) and its right to acquire the Saratoga 
Property at the time of closing. 
[See, Addendum to Brief of Appellees Carson and Bustos at p. 15 ("Addendum"); R. at 
39-42.] Plaintiff Russell received the fruits of the contract. He acquired the right to 
purchase the Saratoga propeity from CMT for precisely the amount of money PRP agreed 
to pay. Other than the right to acquire the Saratoga property for the agreed upon price, 
the assignment to Russell expressly excluded any further rights: 
Russell and RPI acknowledge and agree that upon the consummation of the 
transaction set forth in this Agreement, neither Russell nor RPI shall have 
any further interest in and to PRP or any of its assets, projects or properties. 
[See, Addendum at p. 16; R. 40.] In other words, PRP specifically reserved any other 
"assets" not specifically identified in the transaction - including its causes of action, if 
any, arising out of the Contract. In considering whether assignees have standing to bring 
particular claims, courts "determine exactly what has been assigned to make certain that 
the plaintiff is the real party in interest with regard to the particular claim involved in the 
action." C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1545 (1971). 
In this case, it is clear from the face of the assignment that other than the right to purchase 
the Saratoga property, no other "asset" of PRP, including its causes of action, if any, were 
part of the assignment. 
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Second, even if this Court were to determine that causes of action generally were 
assigned to Plaintiff Russell by the terms of the agreement, fraud claims are personal in 
nature and therefore should not be included: 
Unless a contrary intention is manifest or inferable, an assignment 
ordinarily carries with it all rights, remedies and benefits which are 
incidental to the thing assigned, except as those which are personal to the 
assignor and for his benefit. 
WAMCO, III v. First Piedmont Mortgage Corp., 856 F. Supp."1076, 1086 (E.D. Va. 
1994) (citing 6A C.J.S. Assignments § 76). Courts routinely hold that this principle 
precludes assignments of purely personal causes of action, such as claims for fraud. See 
id.; see also, Huston v. Ohio & Colorado Smelting & Refining Co., 165 P. 251 (Colo. 
1917) (claim for fraud by purchaser of stock was not assigned when original purchaser 
sold that stock); Schwartz v. Durham, 80 P.2d 453 (Ariz. 1938) ("right of action growing 
out of fraud is usually a personal right to the extent that it does not pass with an 
assignment of the thing to which the right relates") (citations omitted). Thus, because the 
Russell Plaintiffs are attempting to bring a fraud claim - which is personal in nature and 
was not specifically included in the assignment, they lack standing to assert this cause of 
action. 
Third, and perhaps most important, it bears repeating that the conduct about which 
the Russell Plaintiffs are complaining allegedly occurred in a transaction to which 
Plaintiff Russell's assignor, PRP, was not even a party - the Saratoga-CMT transaction. 
[R. 82 at ffif 65, 68.] The Russell Plaintiffs are not Saratoga themselves, nor assignees of 
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Saratoga. Because the Russell Plaintiffs' claims fundamentally derive from their effort to 
assert the rights of an unrelated third party, there can be no standing as a matter of law. 
Because the right to bring a cause of action with respect to the underlying real 
estate transactions was not assigned; and because even if it was, the Russell Plaintiffs 
were in no event assigned the right to bring a claim for fraud arising out of the Saratoga-
CMT transaction, they have no standing to assert a claim for fraud. 
III. PLAINTIFFS' FRAUD CLAIM FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
In addition to the statute of limitations and the lack of standing, Plaintiffs fraud 
claims fail as a matter of law for at least five reasons: (1) the alleged misrepresentations 
are immaterial to the transaction; (2) the alleged misrepresentations were not made to the 
Russell Plaintiffs, or with the intent to induce the Russell Plaintiffs to take any action; 
(3) the alleged misrepresentations were not revealed prior to the time the Russell 
Plaintiffs consummated the transaction and therefore were not misrepresentations upon 
which they could have reasonably relied; (4) the alleged misrepresentations were, 
according to the Russell Plaintiffs, made by Thomas (a manager of PRP) to PRP, and a 
party cannot commit fraud on itself; and (5) Plaintiffs suffered no damages because they 
received exactly what they bargained to receive.4 
4
 While additional arguments are included in this Section, the Court of Appeals 
may affirm the decision on any legal ground or theory apparent from the record, even 
though such ground or theory was not raised in the lower court. Bailey v. Baylest 52 P.3d 
1158, 1161 (Utah 2002). 
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First, the alleged misrepresentation identified by Plaintiffs - that Saratoga did not 
know the true identity of the buyer - is immaterial.5 The misrepresentation allegedly 
made to Saratoga - concerning the identity of the buyer - was immaterial to the 
transaction. "The identity of the other party to the transaction is material if the 
transaction would not have been consummated had the seller known who the buyer was, 
and if the latter either knew, or had good reason to know, of the seller's disposition 
against him." 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 48 (2001). In this case, the Russell 
Plaintiffs fail even to allege that the identity of the buyer was material to Saratoga, or that 
Saratoga would have refused to accept $1,800,000 for the properties - if only Saratoga 
had known the money came from CMT. 
Second, the Russell Plaintiffs correctly point out that for a material 
misrepresentation to constitute fraud, it must be made for the purpose of inducing 
plaintiffs to act, and plaintiffs must rely on it to their detriment. Pace v. Parrish, 247 
P.2d 273 (Utah 1952); see also, Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 301 (Utah 1978) 
(plaintiff must "prove the defendant knowingly misrepresented a material fact with intent 
5
 The Russell Plaintiffs set forth the purported misrepresentations as follows: 
"Carson and Thomas further led Saratoga to believe PRP was purchasing the Saratoga 
lots directly from Saratoga by presenting to Saratoga, through Thomas' connection with 
PRP, PRP's proprietary plans and drawing for the development and construction of the 
Saratoga Lots." [See, Brief of Appellant at p. 6 (emphasis added).] They further state: 
"Believing CMT was affiliated with or a part of PRP, based on the representations by the 
Carson Defendants, Saratoga agreed to sell the Saratoga Lots to CMT." [See, Brief of 
Appellant at p. 7 (emphasis added).] 
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to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from action"); King v. Nevada Elec. Inv. Co., 893 
F. Supp. 1006, 1012 (D. Utah 1993) (without proof of any affirmative, material 
misrepresentation by defendant to plaintiff, no fraud claim will lie). The Russell 
plaintiffs, however, have not alleged any misrepresentation was made by any of the 
Defendants to them. Instead, they allege that Defendants falsely misrepresented to 
Saratoga that CMT was "affiliated with, owned by, or part of plaintiffs." [R. 78 at f 38.] 
The Russell Plaintiffs further allege that they "reasonably believed" that CMT was 
"affiliated with, owned by, or was a part of Saratoga, which it was not." [Id. at f 37.] 
However, nowhere do they allege that Defendants ever made such representations to them 
or with the intent to cause them to act or refrain from action.6 Without proof of a 
misrepresentation intended to make Plaintiffs act, or refrain from acting, there can be no 
claim for fraud. 
Third, in an apparent (although misguided) effort to save their claims from being 
time-barred, the Russell Plaintiffs contend that they did not even learn of the alleged 
misrepresentation to Saratoga until the Spring of 2000, nearly three and a half years after 
the contract with CMT was executed. Plaintiffs therefore could not possibly have relied 
on any such misrepresentation in November of 1996. Thus, Plaintiffs cannot meet the 
6
 By the time the trial court entered its order of dismissal, the Plaintiffs had 
already amended their complaint once, and they did not ask for another opportunity to do 
so in connection with the hearing on Defendants' motion to dismiss. Presumably the 
fraud claim was by then pleaded as well as it could be pleaded. 
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threshold requirement of showing that they relied to their detriment upon any 
misrepresentations by the Defendants. See, Robinson v. Tripco Inv. Inc., 21 P.3d 219, 
224 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (plaintiff must prove that he or she "acting reasonably and in 
ignorance of the statement's falsity, did in fact rely upon the misrepresentation.") 
(quotation omitted). 
Fourth, the Russell Plaintiffs' fraud claim is premised entirely upon their rights as 
an assignee of PRP's right, title and interest in the Saratoga property.7 Yet, Plaintiffs do 
not argue that PRP took any action in reliance on misrepresentations made by Thomas, 
nor could they, because PRP consisted only of Thomas and Russell. [R. 73 at TJ 5.] A 
party cannot commit fraud upon itself. Since Thomas allegedly knew of the Defendants' 
"scheme," he cannot have relied upon misrepresentations he either made or knew were 
false. Furthermore, as a matter of law, both Russell and PRP were charged with the 
knowledge that Thomas had, which included the knowledge that CMT and Saratoga were 
not the same entity, and that the sale price from Saratoga to CMT was $25,000 per lot. 
[R. 78 at ffl| 37, 38.] See e.g., United Park City Mines Co., 870 P.2d at 886 (if one 
director knew facts which by the exercise of due diligence could have led to the discovery 
of alleged wrongdoing, that director's knowledge is imputed to the corporation) (citing 
Interlake Porsche & Audi, Inc., v. Bucholz, 728 P.2d 597, 607 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986)). 
7
 "It is the purchase of [the Saratoga Lots] and the representations, acts and 
omissions associated with it which form the basis of the Russell Plaintiffs' claims against 
the Carson Defendants." [See, Brief of Appellant at p.21.] 
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Finally, the Russell Plaintiffs cannot prove damages on their fraud claim. To 
prove fraud on a contract, a plaintiff must show that he did not receive the benefit of his 
bargain. It is not, however, "for the jury to make a new contract for the parties or fix a 
new price on plaintiffs property." Hecht v. Metzler, 48 P. 37 (Utah 1897) (citing Drew v. 
Beall, 62 111. 164 (111. 1871)). Utah follows the majority rule, which provides that 
damages in a fraud case are based on the difference between the actual value of what was 
received and the value thereof if it had been as represented. Dilworth v. Lauritzen, 424 
P.2d 136, 138 (Utah 1967). Here, Plaintiff Russell got exactly that for which he 
bargained. PRP executed a real estate contract agreeing to pay $30,000 per lot to CMT 
for the Saratoga property. PRP assigned its purchase rights to Plaintiff Russell, who did 
pay $30,000 per lot to CMT and received precisely the parcels for which he paid. Only 
when a party to a contract fails to receive what was represented, can there be any claim 
for fraud. 
In sum, the Russell Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate any fraud. The purported 
misrepresentations are wholly immaterial to the underlying transactions. Moreover, 
Plaintiffs do not allege that a misrepresentation was made to them, but to Saratoga. They 
further contend that they were not aware of the misrepresentations until three and half 
years after they claim to have relied upon them. In addition, their fraud allegation is 
premised entirely upon their assignment of PRP's rights, and there can be no claim that 
the principal of PRP (Thomas) defrauded PRP. Finally, since Plaintiffs got exactly what 
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they bargained for - 72 lots for $30,000 per lot - they suffered no damages. 
For the foregoing reasons the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' fraud claims 
should be affirmed. 
IV. PLAINTIFFS' COMMERCIAL BRIBERY CLAIM FAILS AS A MATTER 
OF LAW. 
Plaintiffs' claims of commercial bribery pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-508 
also must fail as a matter of law because the penal code provides no private right of 
action. Plaintiffs' claim is based on Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-508, a penal statute making it 
a class A misdemeanor to engage in commercial bribery. Specifically, the statute 
provides as follows: 
(1) A person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor when, 
without the consent of the employer or principal, contrary to 
the interests of the employer or principal: 
(a) he confers, offers, or agrees to confer upon the 
employee, agent, or fiduciary of an employer or 
principal any benefit with the purpose of 
influencing the conduct of the employee, agent, or 
fiduciary in relating to his employer's or 
principal's affairs; or 
(b) he, as an employee, agent, or fiduciary of an 
employer or principal, solicits, accepts, or agrees 
to accept any benefit from another upon an 
agreement or understanding that such benefit will 
influence his conduct in relation to his employer's 
or principal's affairs; provided that this section 
does not apply to inducements made or accepted 
solely for the purpose of causing a change in 
employment by an employee, agent, or fiduciary. 
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(2) A person is guilty of a violation of this section if he holds 
himself out to the public as being engaged in the business of 
making disinterested selection, appraisal, or criticism of 
goods or services and he solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept 
any benefit to influence his selection, appraisal, or criticism. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-508. 
Notably, the statute does not provide for any private right of action based on the 
proscribed conduct. As set forth below, under Utah law a cause of action will not be 
implied where the Legislature has not provided for one. Thus, there is no private right of 
action for commercial bribery under Utah law, and the dismissal of Plaintiffs5 Fourth 
Cause of Action should be affirmed. 
A. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-508 Does Not Expressly Provide a Private Right 
of Action for Violation of the Statute. 
Section 76-6-508 does not provide for a private right of action. Instead, it simply 
states that the proscribed conduct constitutes a class A misdemeanor. It is axiomatic 
under Utah law that "statutes are to be construed according to their plain language." 
Cannon v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 994 P.2d 824, p22 (Utah App. 2000) (quoting Arndt 
v. First Interstate Bank, 991 P.2d 584 (Utah 1999)). See alsoy O'Keefe v. Utah State 
Retirement Bd., 956 P.2d 279, 281 (Utah 1998). Courts "do not look beyond the plain 
language unless [they] find ambiguity." Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre Inv. Co., 956 P.2d 
257, 259 (Utah 1998). Applying these well-established canons of statutory construction, 
it is plain that no private right of action is provided for in § 76-6-508. 
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B. Utah Courts Do Not Imply a Private Right of Action Where None Is 
Provided by the Express Terms of the Statute. 
Under Utah law, a private right of action is not implied. In Broadbent v. Board of 
Education, 910 P.2d 1274, 1278 (Utah App. 1996), the court rejected the plaintiffs 
attempt to assert a private cause of action on the basis of a statute that did not clearly 
provide for it. The Broadbent court explained that "[w]hile there is a considerable body 
of law involving the creation of private rights of action under federal law, the courts of 
this state are not generally in the habit of implying a private right of action based upon 
state law, absent some specific direction from the Legislature." Id. (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1974), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that where a criminal statute relied upon by the plaintiff provided no 
private right of action, the matter was best left to the Legislature. The Court therefore 
declined to fashion a private remedy. See also, J.H. by D.H. v. West Valley City, 840 
P.2d 115, 125 (Utah 1992) (declining to create a private right of action for failure to 
challenge city's failure to follow hiring procedures required by state statute). 
The foregoing authority plainly illustrates the futility of Plaintiffs' Fourth Cause of 
Action. There is no private right of action for commercial bribery under Utah law, and 
the law does not imply one. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint and 
First Amended Complaint should be affirmed. 
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